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Chapter 6 
 
On the Legal Validation of Sexual 
Relationships 
 
RICHARD STITH1 
 
Working within a liberal political paradigm, one that privileges freedom and 
equality while eschewing the inculcation of moral excellence for its own 
sake, this essay will make two proposals: first, that certain same-sex unions 
should be legally validated, and second, that certain different-sex unions 
should no longer be legally valid. The former would seem fairly unprob-
lematic, while the latter may be useful as a political compromise despite its 
possible costs. More important than either proposal, however, will be the 
conceptual clarity (regarding the public interest in marriage) achieved en 
route to them. 
Non-Validation Is Not Prohibition 
In order to prepare the ground for these two proposals, a fundamental 
misunderstanding needs to be cleared up: the idea that same-sex marriages 
are currently forbidden by law. This issue must be dealt with in advance 
because within liberalism all laws limiting freedom are suspect, and a heavy 
burden of proof lies upon anyone who wishes to leave them in place. The 
starting point for the forthcoming proposals is, however, that no limits are 
now placed on freedom to marry, in that same-sex unions are already 
                                                 
1 J.D. Yale Law School, Ph.D. Yale University, Professor of Law, Valparaiso University 
(IN). This article modifies and expands Keeping Friendship Unregulated, 18 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL‘Y 263 (2004). The author gladly acknowledges the able 
research assistance of Charles Kohler and Marcus Flinders. [This SSRN version is a 
combination of the final draft Word version and the actual published version.  
Bracketed numbers in bold refer to the pagination found in the published version. 
*The article begins on page 143 of the volume published by Hein.] 
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completely legal. Like almost all other human relationships
2
, they are simply 
ignored by the state, and the burden of proof weighs instead upon those who 
advocate government registration and regulation of them.  
 [144]Getting and staying married to someone of one‘s own sex is not 
punishable conduct in any modern jurisdiction, as far as research for this 
article has been able to uncover.
3
 True, homosexual sex acts were 
traditionally penalized, and that perhaps amounted to a kind of indirect 
prohibition on same-sex marriage, but even then religious or non-religious 
marriage vows were not themselves necessarily sanctioned. In any event, 
courts or legislatures throughout the developed world have largely 
eliminated prohibitions on such sex acts and have not replaced them with 
legal duties not to make religious or other vows and live together as married. 
Thus lack of legal recognition of gay marriage does not in any way limit 
conduct, as does ordinary legal prohibition. To say ―gay marriage is 
prohibited‖ because its duties are not enforced in court is as incorrect as 
saying ―gambling is prohibited‖ because gambling debts are not enforced in 
court.  
 Indeed, it is marriage recognition that limits future behavioral freedom: 
Entering into a concurrent marriage now becomes punishable as bigamy; 
having sex with someone else may become adultery; divorce may involve 
onerous supervision by the state; and the like.
4
  
                                                 
2 ―Relationship‖ here encompasses all ongoing human relations of closeness, support, and 
cooperation. But nothing turns on terminology; words such as ―friendship,‖ ―partner-
ship,‖ and the like may be substituted without change of meaning, and are often so 
substituted in the course of this article. 
3 Although the Human Rights Campaign Foundation states that 42 states have ―anti-gay 
marriage‖ statutes, in none of the listed statutes is there a penalty, such as imprisonment 
or a fine, for homosexuals living together in a marriage or marriage-like relationship (or 
attempting to do so). Human Rights Campaign Foundation, HRC FamilyNet, States with 
anti-gay marriage laws, http://www.hrc.org/documents/marriage_prohibitions_2009.pdf 
The only punishment in any state constitution or statute is in Oklahoma where ―Any 
person knowingly issuing a marriage license in violation of this section shall be guilty of 
a misdemeanor. Ok. Const. Art. II § 35. But this penalizes the clerk who legally validates 
a marriage, not the couple or the relationship itself. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), would seem to nullify any U.S. law (if there were one) that 
prohibited homosexuals from making private marriage vows, because such a ban would 
―seek to control a personal relationship.‖ Id. at 567, 2478. A few state statutes might 
arguably fall into this category. For example, Arizona law states ―Marriage between 
persons of the same sex is void and prohibited.‖ ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(C) 
(Westlaw current through the end of the Forty-Ninth Legislature effective Apr. 24, 2009). 
However, the lack of any attached penalty would seem to turn this ―prohibition‖ into little 
more than a redundant statement of non-recognition. 
4 Marriage recognition may obstruct a participant‘s ability to separate by imposing 
divorce proceedings, property division, and alimony; it may limit an individual‘s freedom 
to bequeath property upon death; it may make an individual liable for spousal debts; and 
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 [145]This point may seem so obvious as not to be worth juristic 
comment. Media sound-bites referring to gay marriage ―prohibitions‖ may 
be the product of lay misunderstandings, or perhaps attempts to fortify the 
political arguments in favor of same-sex marriage by making current laws 
seem (incorrectly) to attack liberty. But it is an error into which no less a 
jurist than United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has fallen. 
He imagines that non-validation of same-sex unions amounts somehow to a 
prohibition against them. Dissenting in the Lawrence v. Texas case that 
struck down criminal laws against homosexual sodomy, Scalia lists laws not 
recognizing same-sex marriage right along with laws limiting sexual 
conduct: 
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, 
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are … called 
into question by today‘s decision … See ante, at 2480 (noting ―an 
emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult 
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex‖ (emphasis added [by Justice Scalia])).
5 
Scalia adds that it is impossible to distinguish homosexual sodomy from 
same-sex marriage and ―other traditional ‗morals‘ offenses.‖
6
 However, 
same-sex marriage cannot be a criminal offense as long as it has absolutely 
no existence in the eyes of the law. Where the state wholly ignores what 
gays and lesbians do with their liberty—e.g. making and maintaining vows 
of fidelity—the state is unable to restrict that liberty.  Mere behavioral 
                                                                                                             
it may restrict a member‘s sexual partners through social and even criminal norms. (For 
instance, adultery—an offense only when a married person is involved—is punishable in 
various states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (1992, Westlaw current through the 2009 
Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. §18-6-501 (1992, Westlaw current through laws effective 
Mar. 25, 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (Westlaw current through 2009 First Reg. 
Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (1993, Westlaw current through the 2009 
1st Annual Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 750.30 (1991, Westlaw current through 
2009 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (1993, Westlaw current through 2009).) See 
also Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QLR 27 (1996) (arguing that 
marriage is more aptly defined by its benefits to government rather than to the married 
couple). 
5 Supra note 3, at 589, 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
6 Id. By contrast, the majority opinion in Lawrence supports the view of this essay that 
liberty may require non-punishment of an ongoing personal relationship that preexists 
any state action without requiring state validation thereof: ―The statutes [banning homo-
sexual sodomy] seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to 
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being 
punished as criminals.‖ Id. at 567, 2478. Given Scalia‘s ordinary acuity, one cannot but 
wonder whether he made his obviously fallacious argument in order to draw the majority 
out onto the record with the correct distinction just cited. 
 RICHARD STITH 
liberty may, of course, not be full social liberty. If I am allowed to go 
through the motions of voting, but for some reason am not eligible to have 
my vote counted, it seems a joke to tell me my freedom has not been 
restricted. When a legislature is disabled from passing unconstitutional 
legislation, its liberty is at least as effectively curtailed as would be the case 
if it were punished for passing such laws.
7
 Where the only social point 
[146]of an act is to achieve legal validity, the law‘s refusal to validate that 
act amounts to a legal prohibition of it. 
 Yet as H.L.A. Hart has pointed out, denial of legal recognition need not 
have a suppressive intent or effect.
8
 It would be very strange to see the rules 
for wills or contracts as draconian means of making testation-without-two-
witnesses and promises-without-reciprocity impossible. No modern state 
seeks to put an end to deathbed requests to one listener, or to stop unilateral 
promising, or to eliminate more solemn extralegal acts such as clerical 
ordinations or monastic vows. The law does not validate such acts, but it has 
nothing against their having social force. 
 The difference here is between full ―invalidation‖ and what may be 
called mere ―non-validation.‖ The first deprives the non-recognized act of 
virtually all significance; the second simply fails to add legal recognition to 
what remains a significant social act.
9
 
 On which side of the line does non-recognition of committed same-sex 
relationships lie? Except for the presumably miniscule number of such 
relationships whose only purpose is to obtain some legal benefit not 
otherwise obtainable privately
10
, e.g. a tax break, these friendships surely 
carry great weight for those in and around them, quite apart from whether 
they achieve legal recognition. They are more like extralegal promises that 
matter a great deal than they are like legislation that has been nullified by a 
                                                 
7 For an argument that invalidation may be a more absolute curtailment of liberty than 
punishment, because invalidation makes the act in question impossible rather than just 
costly, see R. Stith, Punishment, Invalidation, and Nonvalidation: What H.L.A. Hart Did 
Not Explain, 14 LEGAL THEORY 219, 221–26 (2008). 
8 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 26–41 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2d ed. 1994).  
9 See article cited supra note 7, where the distinction between invalidation and non-
validation is explored in greater detail. 
10 A great many of the legal responsibilities/benefits of marriage may be already available 
to unmarried couples, and may even be imposed on them in the absence of any explicit 
contract, regardless of their sexual orientation. See American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES 
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Chapter 6, 
Domestic Partners (2002). For critiques of this new tendency, see Shahar Lifshitz, 
Spousal Rights and Spousal Duties, The liberal case for privileging marriage, infra, at 
Ch. 7, p. 177, and Helen M. Alvaré, “You Can’t Get There From Here”: A Reply to 
Proposals to Disestablish Marriage as the Path to Care,” infra at Ch. 4, p. 71. 
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constitution or court. In this they are similar to most committed human 
relationships. Our friendships are not generally recognized, registered, or 
otherwise validated by the law, but it would be odd to say that the law 
―invalidates‖ them. Though they remain non-validated by the law, they are 
not debilitated by it. 
 No humane polity, least of all a liberal one, would want it otherwise. 
Only a totalitarian state would seek to regulate, or even to take note of, all 
human relationships—be they sexual or non-sexual. The loss of privacy, 
freedom, and flexibility, and the cost of the bureaucracy that would acquire 
and keep such records, would be too great.  
 [147]Before the state reaches down into private life to pluck out and 
regulate any friendship or other relationship, it should have to show 
something unusual about the relationship in question, something that calls 
especially for public supervision. In a liberal polity, it is submitted that such 
state intervention is justified only when the relationship either conduces 
strongly to the common weal or woe, or else endangers vulnerable 
individuals too weak to protect themselves. It is by this yardstick that we 
now proceed to measure first heterosexual and then homosexual sexual 
relationships. 
Is There a Public Need for Legal  
Validation of Sexual Relationships  
between Heterosexuals? 
 Every modern state maintains a registry of regulated different-sex 
unions, i.e. of marriages. At first sight, this may seem odd. Marriage law 
may appear to be some hangover from an earlier moral paternalism, rather 
than like an instrument of individual freedom; it is so regarded by some 
contemporary thinkers.
11
 It makes no sense, however, to think that liberal, 
secular states would go out of their way to restrict freedom for the sake of an 
antiquated morality. And if governments were somehow strongly interested 
in preserving ancient, quasi-religious customs, why would they always stop 
at marriage? Why not officially certify and reinforce the limitations that 
result from other spiritually significant relationship events, such as the 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1994) 
(arguing that marriage lacks legal as well as experiential coherence and is a place-holder 
for a series of idealized value judgments about our intimate lives). 
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aforementioned ordination of priests and ministers or the monastic vow of 
stability?
12
 But no modern state does these things. 
Why, then, do governments continue to register and structure hetero-
sexual marriages, if not for the sake of morals or religion? Is there some 
compelling reason that could account for state interest in sexual friendship 
between women and men, and only in that sort of friendship? Everyone 
knows the answer: Sexual relations between women and men may generate 
children, beings at once highly vulnerable and essential for the future of 
every human community. The good of those children as well as the common 
good thus require that the state do all it can to channel such relations into 
stable and secure relationships. Vows of lasting monogamy receive public 
[148]recognition and reinforcement because they help produce human 
beings able to practice ordered liberty. 
To the degree that the state is successful in allowing procreation only 
within marriage, it furthers at least three important secular purposes: It 
enables children to know who their true father is and thus to know on whom 
they have a legal and moral claim for support. (The advent of DNA testing 
may weaken this reason for faithful marriage, however, by making fathers 
easier to identify quite apart from marital vows.) It enables children to have 
that true father at home, where he can do them the most good. (Here the 
advent of DNA testing may strengthen the need for fidelity in marriage, in 
that such testing may overcome old presumptions of paternity and reveal 
which husbands are not the true fathers of their wives‘ children.) Perhaps 
most importantly, limiting procreation only to married couples stabilizes 
long-term coordination between the child‘s two parents, who (if not bound 
to one another) might otherwise pull the child in different directions. 
Note that the state interest in marriage begins at the point where 
potentially fertile persons first engage in intercourse, not at the point when 
conception is known to have occurred. By that later time, the father may 
have wandered away. He needs to be bound to mother and child from the 
beginning. Put another way, heterosexual sexual relationships, without any 
outside help or knowledge and without a conscious decision by either 
partner, are able to engender children. So there is a public interest in 
stabilizing them as soon as intercourse may occur. 
                                                 
12 The Rule of St. Benedict states that when a man or woman is to be received into a 
monastery, he or she ―promises before all in the oratory stability, fidelity to monastic life 
and obedience‖ (Chapter 58, emphasis added). The Rule requires that someone be 
punished ―who would presume to leave the enclosure of the monastery and go anywhere 
or do anything, however small, without an order‖ from the abbot or abbess (Chapter 67). 
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This secular interest could in theory be implemented through legal 
punishment for intercourse outside of monogamous marriage, i.e. penalties 
for fornication and adultery. However, in practice legitimate concern for 
privacy militates against protecting marriage by penalties for extramarital 
sex, except indirectly where a public act is involved (i.e. penalties for 
bigamy). But it clearly remains rational for the liberal state to encourage 
community moral disapproval of heterosexual sexual acts out of wedlock, at 
least as long as contraception is not practiced by almost everyone with high 
success. 
 In any event, as far as the law is concerned, marriage today is streng-
thened primarily by reward rather than by punishment. The public weal 
requires special benefits for marriage in order to attract as many as possible 
potentially fertile couples publicly to undertake those commitments that are 
best for children. Some couples would not be willing to accept public 
involvement (and even control, through support and divorce laws, for 
example) in their most intimate concerns if they had no strong incentives to 
do so. Furthermore, being sexually faithful and raising children obviously 
involve burdens still heavier than putting up with public intrusion in one‘s 
intimate life. Since bearing these burdens of time and effort eventually 
benefits the whole community, by producing educated and disciplined [149] 
citizens, it makes sense for the community to provide concrete rewards in 
the form of special tax, social security, and other legal benefits.
13
 This is 
especially true where one spouse—usually the woman, but sometimes the 
man—gives up much or all of a career for the sake of raising children. Such 
a parent voluntarily shares the vulnerability of her or his children by 
becoming a dependent. Justice, the good of the children, and the common 
good all demand that the community at least lessen the financial cost of such 
self-sacrifice.
14
 
 The greatest moral reward of legal marriage remains, even today, the 
achievement of full legitimacy for sexual intercourse through the removal of 
any remnant of legal or moral disapprobation. Even in communities where 
most people do not judge sex outside marriage to be immoral, there is a 
minority that still makes this judgment. And, as we have seen, there is a state 
                                                 
13 Included among the benefits married persons enjoy are spousal privilege under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, Social Security survivors‘ benefits based upon the spouse‘s 
work history, pension benefits, immigration preferences, immunity from Federal Estate 
and Gift Taxes on transfers between spouses, health insurance benefits, tort rights in each 
other, intestate succession preferences, and conjugal visits. Steven K. Homer, supra note 
11, at 515. 
14 Thus the Internal Revenue Code adds a special income tax benefit (joint return) for 
such households. See I.R.C § 1(a) (2003). 
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interest in encouraging this negative evaluation, in order to minimize the 
number of children born out of wedlock, so this moral judgmentalism should 
never disappear completely. But once a woman and man are married, no one 
today, not even the most traditionally-minded person, thinks sexual 
intercourse between them to be immoral. 
 Note that, in the absence of some unusual community desire for an 
increase in population, neither procreation, nor marriage, nor sex within 
marriage receive special community moral approval. If we think that 
parenthood, marriage or sexual intercourse brings happiness, we may well 
feel sorry for those who remain childless, single or chaste. But we do not 
think them to be immoral or to be second-class citizens. There is little or no 
positive moral or civic benefit to getting married or to engaging in marital 
sex in the modern world. There is only the complete removal of any prior 
community moral disapprobation of sexual intercourse.  
 Because of the needs of children and the supports for parenting offered 
by marriage law and morality, the reasons for getting married become 
stronger as the likelihood of children increases. It may be possible for a 
different-sex couple very skilled at contraception never to think about 
marriage. But once they decide to raise a child together, they will at the least 
seriously consider a wedding.  
 So far, then, modern society‘s linkage between fertility and marriage 
seems sensible and consistent. However, if the argument of this essay is 
[150]right—that a liberal regime should get into the business of validating 
sexual relationships only when necessary to protect children—why would 
we permit a marriage begun in the years of youth to last far beyond child-
bearing age and even permit elderly and other infertile heterosexuals to 
begin a new marriage?  
 Letting marriage last a lifetime is easy to justify. Even adult children 
often need their parents for guidance and security in raising the grand-
children. It would also be intrusive and disruptive of ongoing family life, as 
well as often unfair to a dependent, non-working spouse, to terminate 
marriage automatically as soon as the wife became infertile, thus freeing the 
still-fertile husband to get married to a younger woman. Moreover, the law 
should do nothing to facilitate an elderly man switching partners and then 
begetting children, since he is relatively likely to die before those children 
reach adulthood. 
 Perhaps we could screen people for infertility before letting them 
marry. But such screening would probably be a burdensome and politically 
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unpalatable search into a private domain.
15
 And there would sometimes 
remain at least a slight chance of a child emerging from heterosexual 
relations believed to have been infertile.
16
 
 However, where infertility is easy to determine with near certainty in a 
non-intrusive way, then the argument so far does indeed cut against new 
marriages for infertile heterosexual couples. Where one of the elderly 
partners in a sexual relationship is a woman of clearly post-menopausal age, 
what possible interest could the state have in their sex life? And if it has no 
such interest, why would it offer to marry them? Just to make them privately 
happy? That is surely not a special interest of the state in their friendship as 
opposed to its interest in the happiness of participants in other non-fertile 
relationships. Moreover, the absence of legal marriage would not preclude 
religious marriage, or other forms of private mutual commitment, that could 
secure their emotional wellbeing and make sexual relations seem morally 
permissible and appropriate to them and their peers. Anti-fornication statutes 
(should any remain on the books) could nominally be applied to such legally 
unrecognized unions, but those laws are rarely if ever enforced. In the 
United States they could be held invalid under Lawrence (for here, as in 
[151]Lawrence itself, a ―personal relationship‖ would be injured by 
enforcement of such statutes).
17
 
 The only non-religious explanation for granting elderly couples the 
right to get married may be pre-liberal: Even where they are infertile, males 
and females can be said to be in their natures (as shown, e.g., by their 
anatomy) to be designed for heterosexual reproduction. Every woman is the 
proper kind of being to engage in fertile sexual relations: Her body is 
designed to conceive a child when fully functioning, even if through age or 
illness it has become disabled in part.
18
 We honor that womanhood in letting 
her legally marry, as opposed to insisting that she is now gender-imperfect.  
                                                 
15There could even be constitutional problems with imposing burdensome conditions on a 
right to marry.  
16 See Miller v. Rivard, 585 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (male begat child three 
months after a fertility test found him sterile) and Lefkowitz v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 
94 A.D.2d 18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (upholding appellant‘s right to refuse a fertility test 
on the ground of potential danger, while noting evidence that the test might not produce 
conclusive results on the patient‘s fertility). 
17 Under Lawrence, supra note 3 at 567, 2478, a state may not ―seek to control a personal 
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the 
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.‖  
18 Robert P. George and Gerard V. Bradley summarize the natural law tradition on this 
point: ―The marital quality of spousal intercourse is not vitiated … [by] the permanent 
loss of fertility with age.‖ Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301 n.4, at 
301–02 (1995). 
 RICHARD STITH 
 Is a person‘s ―nature‖ (kind, essence, type, design, and the like) an 
impermissibly overbroad standard for his or her legal treatment? Is one‘s 
current functioning the only valid legal criterion? If so, how can we continue 
to consider seriously disabled persons to possess equal human dignity under 
the law? 
 We cannot proclaim human equality at all unless we focus on kind 
rather than on the quality of current functioning, for human beings are equal 
only in being human beings. That is, we need a fixed category of being 
before we can insist that all beings in that category be treated equally. The 
fundamental liberal rights to freedom and equality require a pre-liberal 
assessment of the kind of being that has to be accorded those rights.
19
 Not 
                                                 
19 The liberal political theorist John Rawls, for example, turns to a human being‘s nature 
(using the words ―capacity,‖ ―realization,‖ ―developed,‖ ―potentiality,‖ and ―could‖) 
rather than to his or her current functioning in order to discern the reach of human rights. 
Rawls writes that 
the minimal requirements defining moral personality refer to a capacity and not to 
the realization of it. A being that has this capacity, whether or not it is yet 
developed, is to receive the full protection of the principles of justice. Since 
infants and children are thought to have basic rights …, this interpretation of the 
requisite conditions seems necessary to match our considered judgments. More-
over, regarding the potentiality as sufficient accords … with the idea that as far as 
possible the choice of principles should not be influenced by arbitrary contingen-
cies. Therefore it is reasonable to say that those who could take part in the [social 
contract], were it not for fortuitous circumstances, are assured equal justice‖ 
(emphasis added).  
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 509 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
Immanuel Kant also relies on humanity as an inner essence or nature, present long 
before it is fully realized, to indicate who has rights to autonomy. The child is ―a being 
endowed with freedom‖ long before it can act freely:  
[T]here follows from procreation in [the marital] community a duty to preserve 
and care for its offspring.… For the offspring is a person, and it is impossible to 
form a concept of the production of a being endowed with freedom through a 
physical operation.… They cannot destroy their child as if he were something 
they had made (since a being endowed with freedom cannot be a product of this 
kind) or as if he were their property, nor can they even just abandon him to 
chance, since they have brought not merely a worldly being but a citizen of the 
world into a condition which cannot now be indifferent to them even just 
according to concepts of right‖ (emphasis in original).  
IMMANUEL KANT, Parental Right, in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Cambridge Texts in 
the History of Philosophy. Mary Gregor ed. & trans., University of South Carolina, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
For further elaboration of the idea of nature or capacity, in the context of disability 
as well as infancy, by means of a contrast between developing and making, see R. STITH, 
Construction, Development, and Revelopment, XVII LIFE AND LEARNING 243 (2007), 
<http://www.uffl.org/vol17/STITH07.pdf>. For a more extensive discussion of political 
fundamentals, see R. Stith, The Priority of Respect: How Our Common Humanity 
Grounds Our Individual Dignity, 44 INT‘L PHIL. Q. 165 (2004).  
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[152]letting elderly women marry may tend to discredit the thinking in terms 
of natural kinds that is essential to a liberal polity.
20
 
Is There a Public Need for Legal  
Validation of Sexual Relationships  
between Homosexuals? 
The child-centered reasons for channeling heterosexual intercourse into 
exclusive and stable unions do not apply to sexual acts between persons of 
the same sex, since such acts can never generate children.
21
 Unless some 
other characteristic of same-sex couples merits special treatment,
22
 requires 
them to be lifted out of the myriad other sorts of friendships and human 
[153]relationships that do not receive legal validation and support, a liberal 
state should let their relationships remain wholly private and unregulated.
23
 
 This is good and bad news for same-sex couples. The lack of any child-
related reason to confine homosexual acts to committed relationships means 
that there is no obvious basis in liberal society for the control of such acts. 
Since they are always infertile, gay or lesbian relationships (regardless of the 
number or sequence of partners) should not be in any way legally limited in 
order to drive and contain such conduct inside stable partnerships. In line 
                                                 
20 Some contemporary philosophers have contended that there are certain ―natural kinds‖ 
to which our concepts conform. See S. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1980). Philosophers of law have also disagreed with the 
contention that our concepts are indeterminate. See, e.g., Michael Moore, Law as a 
Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (Robert George ed., 
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992). 
21 See infra for discussion of adoption by same-sex couples. 
22 There might, of course, be some other important public good especially furthered by 
committed same-sex friendships. One that comes immediately to mind is the containment 
of sexually transmitted diseases. If special civil unions for gays could be shown empir-
ically to be necessary in order significantly to lessen the incidence of AIDS, restructuring 
our law to officially support such unions would make some sense.  
23 Such was the finding of the very significant French National Assembly report of 25 
January 2006 and the ruling by New York‘s highest court on 6 July 2006. Both, of 
course, used only non-religious reasons in coming to this conclusion. Parliamentary 
Report on the Family and the Rights of Children, 12th Legislature of the French National 
Assembly No. 2832 Vol 1, 91 (Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.preservemarriage.ca/docs/ 
France_Report_on_the_Family_Edited.pdf (English version), http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/12/rap-info/i2832.asp (original French version) (arguing that sexuality of 
inherently infertile relationships is exclusively a private matter, in contrast to the state 
interest in fertile relationships); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 374 (2006) 
(agreeing with the concept we have seen in Lawrence that consensual relations between 
same-sex couple are an exclusively private matter, but where children may be involved a 
sexual relationship becomes a legitimate interest to the government).  
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with Lawrence, same-sex couples should be liberated from any state 
restrictions. Though not equivalent to prohibitions, homosexual marriage 
registries could have negative consequences. After all, some gun owners 
find simple registration schemes ominous. Ironically, gays and lesbians may 
turn out to be better off if they live in traditionally-minded states, where they 
are not tempted or pressed
24
 into surrendering their flexibility and freedom.
25
 
 The bad news is of a piece with the good: There is no child-centered 
public need to reward fidelity or long-term commitment when it comes to 
gay or lesbian sex. There is no special reason for tax subsidies or social 
security privileges, for example, to make up for the risk to her career that 
marriage often entails for a potentially fertile woman.  
 Above all, there is no newly appropriate moral approval of sexual 
intercourse for those entering into a same-sex partnership. In other words, 
there is no reason at all to attempt to draw a line among gay or lesbian sex 
acts, disapproving them outside a committed monogamous relationship but 
accepting them once they occur inside such a relationship. And in fact, 
almost no one makes this distinction. Some persons say homosexual acts are 
[154]always morally legitimate; some say they are never legitimate. But few 
if any say they are morally permissible only inside a marriage, civil union, or 
something similar.  
 Same-sex commitments thus do not, cannot, and should not, entail the 
same sense of new-found moral approval for sexual intercourse as does 
traditional marriage. The strong connotation of sexual approval that the word 
―marriage‖ carries is for this reason inappropriate and misleading when it is 
applied to same-sex unions. Labeling them ―marriages‖ begs the fundamen-
tal question animating public debate at least sub rosa, namely whether 
homosexual sex itself is morally good or bad. The label ―marriage‖ says 
―these sex acts take place within a committed union, so they must be 
unobjectionable.‖
26
 But this is a non-sequitur. Only acts that were illegiti-
                                                 
24 See supra note 10. 
25 See Laurie Essig, Same-Sex Marriage: I Don’t Care if It Is Legal, I Still Think It’s 
Wrong—And I’m a Lesbian, SALON, July 10, 2000 (suggesting that marriage is an 
institution founded in the oppression of women and therefore will also oppress 
homosexuals) and Paula Ettlebrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, 
OUT/LOOK NAT‘L GAY & LESBIAN Q. (Fall 1989), reprinted in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
THE LAW, at 723 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1996) (distrusting of state regulation of 
sexuality and possessiveness of marriage), and also articles cited supra notes 4 & 11. 
26 ―From their point of view, same-sex partnership or marriage is a state stamp of appro-
val for homosexuality, which most traditionalists consider deeply immoral.‖ WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? 
WHAT WE‘VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 132 (Oxford 2006) (arguing in favor of 
same-sex marriage). ―Permitting homosexual marriage would be widely interpreted as 
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mate because they might in the end harm children become more acceptable 
in a relatively secure and child-friendly environment. Sex acts among 
persons of the same sex have nothing to do with children and so their 
morality is properly a private matter, or at most a cultural issue to be 
discussed gently within civil society, without regard to marital status.  
A Proposal for Civil Unions in the  
Case of Joint Adoption 
A counter-argument: Are not gay and lesbian unions also potentially fertile, 
in that same-sex couples may jointly adopt children in some communities? 
Such a question is on the right track in attempting to discern a public interest 
in such unions. But the answer to it is ―no.‖ Different-sex unions, without 
any outside help or knowledge and without a conscious decision by either 
spouse, are able to engender children. So there is a public interest in 
stabilizing them as soon as they exist. Same-sex unions in themselves are 
absolutely infertile, so there is no possible child-related reason why the 
public community should care when they are formed or dissolved, though it 
would wish to know if they were to adopt children. If a state decides to 
permit same-sex partners jointly to adopt,
27
 then the point
28
 at which such 
[155]adoptions take place is the moment when such unions need to be 
stabilized. In other words, adoption by same-sex couples is a good reason to 
grant legal recognition to their unions, but only at the time of each 
adoption—not before.
29
 
                                                                                                             
placing a stamp of approval on homosexuality, while decriminalizing sodomy would not, 
or at least not to anywhere near the same extent.‖ Richard A. Posner, SEX AND REASON 
309 (1992). 
27 For some of the policy issues here, see Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor 
Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. 
& POL‘Y 191 (1995) (arguing for homosexual adoption through the use of social science 
data), and Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 
1997 UILLR 833 (1997) (arguing that the social impact on children of such radical 
changes in the form and structure of the family and in the institution of marriage that is 
the basis of the family, and of society, have not been carefully considered).  
28 Adoption may also occur by gradual operation of law, e.g. as proposed by the 
American Law Institute, supra note 10, section 2.03. If so, a legally recognized bond 
between the adopting partners should mature at the same time. 
29 Besides protection of potential children and potential caregivers, another reason to 
reinforce heterosexual unions ab initio is to make the ascription of paternity more 
plausible, as previously discussed. This problem cannot arise in a homosexual union. If 
one partner there has a child—e.g., by artificial insemination or other consciously chosen 
process—it is known with absolute certainty that the other partner is not the biological 
parent. Even if two gay men mix their semen before inseminating a female friend, one of 
them can be shown by DNA testing to be the only biological father. The parenthood of 
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 Put another way: In the case of same-sex couples, it is not the joint 
sexual act but the joint adoptive act that is a matter of public interest, 
because that is where parenthood may begin. This paper takes no position on 
the question of whether or when such joint adoption should take place.
30
 But 
if it does occur, if we decide as a community to entrust the same child to two 
adults of the same sex, then we must do everything possible to encourage 
those two adults to stay together. The word ―marriage‖ should not be used, 
because of its inaccurate and misleading moral meaning in this context, as 
discussed above. But strong civil unions should be available, unions with all 
the positive supports for stability that are granted to marriage. 
 Because these adoption-related unions would have nothing directly to 
do with the intimate sex lives of the couples concerned, they should be much 
less controversial than the more commonly proposed civil unions that have 
same-sex sexual activity as an assumed basis. Even those who think gay or 
lesbian sexual activity to be morally wrong should agree that a child should 
[156]not be pulled in two directions, which is more likely to occur if joint 
adoption is permitted without a civil union between the two adopting adults. 
This child-centered need, plus the fact that the number of couples eligible for 
unions at adoption is likely to be relatively small, assuming that most same-
sex partnerships do not decide to adopt, would help overcome any qualms 
conservatives might have if they still discerned some indirect and mild 
public approbation for same-sex acts implied by such legal recognition. 
 Furthermore, such unions ought to be open to any other two unmarried 
adults whom the state decides to entrust with a joint adoption, regardless of 
their sexual preference and independent of whether they have any sex at all 
with each other—say, two sisters caring for a much younger sibling after 
their parents have died. Again, no position is taken here on whether 
unmarried heterosexual adults should be able jointly to adopt. But if they 
can, a civil union between them would be called for. 
                                                                                                             
the second partner is adoptive and is within the joint control of the partners and the state. 
Therefore, the state need not be concerned about reinforcing the bond between a child‘s 
potential same-sex parents until the adoption becomes legally effective.  
30 One reason for hesitation is this: All agree that at most only a small minority of persons 
are genetically predisposed to homosexuality. So the chances are overwhelming that any 
child placed with a same-sex couple is going to turn out to be a heterosexual in a family 
where the only sexual role models are homosexual. This extremely likely incongruity 
does not mean that every adoption by a same-sex couple is worse than any possible adop-
tion by a different-sex couple, but it is at least a negative factor, possibly a strong one. Of 
course, the homosexual child growing up with heterosexual parents may be in a similar 
plight, but this will happen far less often. (If a ―gay gene‖ or the like could be identified 
in an infant before adoptive placement, this objection would clearly disappear, for in that 
case each child could be matched with the appropriate sort of parents.) 
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 Indeed, either marriage or a civil union ought ordinarily to be required, 
not just optional, for any sort of joint adoption. We cannot without excessive 
social cost stop unattached men and women from conceiving and bearing 
children out of wedlock, but there is little reason for the law itself to create 
two legally unrelated parents for a single child. 
The Continuing Problem of Perceived  
or Real Inequality 
Yet extending civil unions to jointly adopting same-sex couples may not be 
enough for many in the homosexual community. Consider the following 
report: In 2007, The New York Times ran a story about parents who had 
organized to obtain birth certificates for their stillborn children. They wanted 
the state to certify that their children had once existed. ―It‘s about dignity 
and validity. It‘s the same reason why we want things like marriage 
licenses…,‖ declared a leader.
31
 The newspaper report does not go into 
detail, but one imagines that this movement‘s motivation includes an 
element of perceived unfairness: Other children get birth certificates, so why 
not ours? Or at least there would not be a demand for stillbirth recognition if 
there had not first been a practice of live birth recognition. We all tend to 
think we need what others have. 
Such pleas tempt the state to extend its power. It would require great self-
restraint on the part of the state for it to resist this offer to let the state be the 
ultimate arbiter of truth and being. After all, if government officials do 
nothing, they will be blamed and punished politically, so (unless they would 
[157]incur large costs in doing so) they might as well extend legal 
recognition to stillborn children, even though it serves no public purpose. 
 Another example: Seeing the way military heroes receive medals and 
moral approval, a civilian might well ask for something similar: ―If a soldier 
gets a medal for rescuing his buddy from an icy lake, why shouldn‘t my 
brother get one for rescuing me? There should be official ‗Family Hero‘ 
awards. If there aren‘t any, it means the government thinks only soldiers can 
be heroic.‖ Surely the right response would be to explain that military 
courage is rewarded because of the special public interest in it, not because it 
is thought morally superior to civilian courage. And one might recall that 
illiberal polities that officially reward civilian heroism, or other forms of 
                                                 
31 Tamar Lewin, Out of Grief Grows an Advocacy for Legal Certificate of Stillborn Birth, 
NEW YORK TIMES, May 22, 2007, p. A16 (quoting the woman ―who started the 
movement‖). 
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moral excellence for its own sake, would in the end not be ones most of us 
would wish ours to emulate. 
 So it should be for same-sex couples who feel slighted by not being 
offered legal validation. A liberal state should explain that the law is in no 
way against their union; there is just no special public interest in its 
recognition, control, or support. And, to the extent possible, it is a good idea 
to keep friendship unregulated. 
 Such explanations will ring hollow, however, if there are large and 
obvious groups who are rewarded with medals or marriages despite the fact 
that they serve no obvious public purpose. If bullfighters get bravery badges, 
why not brothers? If aged heterosexuals are permitted to marry, why not 
homosexuals?  
 True, as was argued above, new marriages for the elderly can be 
supported for a wholly secular reason: as a way to maintain the pre-liberal 
foundation of liberal society, its necessary basis in natural law thinking. 
However, this response has two strikes against it: First, the argument for 
letting infertile different-sex people marry because their ―natures‖ are still 
the right kind for marital sex is subtle; it may not convince everyone. 
Second, and more important, natural law arguments are something the gay 
rights movement is seeking to counter. Natural law thinking is the main non-
religious support for the claim that homosexual sex is wrong, i.e. that it is in 
the nature of men and women to have sexual relations only with one another. 
Thus the pejorative label of ―unnatural acts‖ was long attached to sex 
between persons of the same sex.
32
 An appeal to our sexual natures is likely 
to carry little weight in the homosexual community. 
 [158]With an appeal to the wisdom of human nature closed off, there 
remain only two ways to eliminate the apparent unfairness in the law‘s 
disparate treatment of homosexuals and equally infertile heterosexuals: 
Either same-sex couples can be granted the right to marry or infertile 
different-sex couples can have that right taken away from them. It will be 
contended below that the former alternative would greatly harm society and 
so the latter should be chosen despite its own costs. 
                                                 
32  
Sexual union (commercium sexuale) is the reciprocal use that one human being 
makes of the sexual organs and capacities of another (usus membrorum et 
facultatum sexualium alterius). This is either a natural use (by which procreation 
of a being of the same kind is possible) or an unnatural use, and unnatural use 
takes place either with a person of the same sex or with an animal of a nonhuman 
species…. [S]uch transgressions … called unnatural (crimina carnis contra 
naturam) … do wrong to humanity in our own person…‖ (emphasis in original) 
Kant, Marriage Right, supra note 19, at 61–62. 
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Negative Consequences of the  
Legal Validation of Sexual Relationships 
between Homosexuals 
This article has not yet contended that validation of same-sex marriage is 
worse for society than any other sort of unnecessary government interven-
tion, e.g., the issuing of certificates for stillbirths. Arguments in favor of 
validation have been countered, but no claim has yet been made that legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage is especially damaging.  
However, the harms caused by such recognition are in fact quite 
significant. Perhaps most obviously, it is unjust to the community as a whole 
that the public purse be used to subsidize couples that do not, as couples, 
equally serve the common good. Those subsidies were set up to encourage 
and support unions that are apt to generate children. It is not right to siphon 
these benefits off and pass them on to people to use largely for their private 
benefit. 
Furthermore, to reward some private relationships would be unjust to 
many remaining unsubsidized relationships. If providing emotional security 
(or division of labor or economies of scale or some other such private 
benefit) were considered a sufficient reason to recognize same-sex couples, 
why not groups of three, four or fourteen? And why limit official unions to 
those based on sex? In fact, how could any sort of important human 
relationship fairly remain unregistrable? 
David Chambers of the University of Michigan Law School, in an 
article favoring same-sex marriage, has written: 
[W]e should respect the…claims made against the hegemony of the two-
person unit…If the law of marriage can be seen as facilitating the 
opportunities of two people to live an emotional life that they find 
satisfying—rather than as imposing a view of proper relationships—the 
law ought to be able to achieve the same for units of more than two….By 
[159]ceasing to conceive of marriage as a partnership composed of one 
person of each sex, the state may become more receptive to units of three 
or more…and to units composed of two people of the same sex but who 
are bound by friendship alone.
33 
                                                 
33 David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal 
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 490–91 (1996). Another 
proposal to use gay marriage as a stepping stone to the validation of sexual and non-
sexual group marriages can be found, signed by important leaders such as Gloria 
Steinem, Barbara Ehrenreich, and Cornell West, in ―Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New 
Strategic Vision for All our Families and Relationships‖ at http//:www.beyondmarriage. 
org (last visited 9 March 2009). See also Kees Waaldijk, Taking Same-Sex Partnership 
 RICHARD STITH 
 What would happen if we took Professor Chambers‘ advice and offered 
generous public benefits to every emotionally satisfying, long-term relation-
ship? Would not the direct and indirect costs rise so high that they could no 
longer be paid? And consider again not only the economic costs, but also the 
quality of civil society. Do we really want a Rhode Island Relationship 
Registry? Even if the government used mainly positive incentives, rather 
than penalties, to support its scheme, would there not be too great an 
intrusion into private life? Would we not have lost too much freedom and 
flexibility in our personal relationships? Would we not have created an 
excessive bureaucracy? 
 Besides its unfairness to taxpayers and to other sorts of friendships, the 
validation of same-sex marriage would be deeply unjust in another way that 
stillbirth certificates and bravery badges would not be: The state would have 
weighed in unnecessarily on one side of a profound moral controversy about 
sexual identity and the meaning of sexual activity. Traditional natural law 
morality argues that our sexual fulfillment lies in engaging in only the sort of 
sex acts for which we are designed in mind and body, namely intercourse 
within committed different-sex marriage. Only there are the normal 
consequences of intercourse benign and beneficial for all concerned; going 
against our marital nature leads to harm all around. Same-sex relations, by 
contrast, assume a different purpose for sex acts, namely mutual enjoyment 
[160]and any bond of friendship that they may strengthen. No sort of 
orgasmic pleasure is more appropriate than another. Gender itself is a facet 
not of our dual-sexed common human nature but of each separate 
individual.
34
  
                                                                                                             
Seriously: European Experiences as British Perspectives, INT‘L FAMILY LAW 14 (June 
2003), https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/dspace/handle/1887/5229 (stating that same-sex 
couples who are non-sexual should be permitted to participate in civil unions). 
Some conservatives have also welcomed (at least as a compromise) an expansion 
of legal recognition and support to many sorts of non-sexual friendships despite its 
obvious costs, apparently because (along with the absence of the word ―marriage‖) the 
removal of sexuality from the definition of such unions would lessen any implication of 
approval for the sort of sex acts practiced within them. See Ryan T. Anderson & Sherif 
Girgis, A Real Compromise on the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: An Invitation to Rauch 
and Blankenthorn, PUBLIC DISCOURSE: ETHICS, LAW, AND THE COMMON GOOD (Feb 24, 
2009), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/viewarticle.php?selectedarticle=2009.02.24. 
001.pdart.  
34 The common but contrary argument that homosexuality is genetically predetermined is 
an anomaly in post-modern thought. If gender is otherwise entirely flexible, why would 
same-sex identity alone be fixed? If our genetic status as men or women does not limit 
our sexuality, why would our same-sex genetic predispositions do so? Without in any 
way seeking to judge the empirical validity of the claims here on either side, one can 
easily discern political reasons for the argument for irrevocable genetic predetermination 
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 It is wrong for a liberal state to intervene in debates concerning natural 
right and wrong, except insofar as may be necessary to secure the 
foundations of equal liberty. Decisions on the meaning of sexual intercourse 
ought in principle to be handled in private, or in civil society (books, 
movies, school debates, church teachings, and the like). It is unfair for the 
liberal state to use force to settle a merely cultural controversy, no matter 
how much it is pressed to do so.
35
 And the mandatory fiat of the state makes 
it less likely that the outcome will be determined only by the most 
appropriate reasons. 
 Moreover, if the claim made earlier is correct, that natural law thinking 
(thinking in terms of kinds or natures) is a necessary pre-liberal basis for the 
liberal commitment to human dignity and equality, then there is a public 
interest in seeing that this sort of thinking (at least in that context) does not 
disappear. But sex is one of the places where the word ―natural‖ is most at 
home, where it comes most easily to the minds of many. To appear legally to 
endorse the view that nothing is more sexually natural or unnatural than 
anything else could endanger the pre-liberal foundation of liberalism. 
 Furthermore, by validating one side of a moral argument for which 
there exists no consensus and for which empirical proof of superiority may 
be difficult, the state does what is functionally equivalent to establishing a 
controverted religion. The problem here is not just unfairness but tyranny. 
[161]Without sufficient basis in public reason to convince those who do not 
believe in the new doctrine, the state must inevitably resort to propaganda 
and force.  
 If gays can get married, there must be nothing wrong with gay sex, and 
so those adoption agencies, hospitals, schools, radio stations, and the like 
that act upon (or even simply teach) other premises are just bigoted and 
                                                                                                             
of same-sex orientation: The argument operates within the natural law paradigm, 
asserting that gay and lesbian people simply have a different nature, are a different kind 
of being from heterosexuals. Thus their sexual orientation should be seen not as a genetic 
deficiency to be overcome or limited, like an inborn tendency to alcoholism, but as 
something to be supported and perfected. If this argument were able to convince the 
opponents of same-sex relations, then the state might indeed be able to license same-sex 
civil unions without appearing to take sides against natural law morality. 
35 Kathleen E. Hull writes that in her interviews with those who favor same-sex marriage, 
―[a]lthough rights and equality were important ways of talking about the value of same-
sex marriage, study participants were just as likely to talk about it in the language of 
social legitimacy and validation.‖ She quotes one person saying ―I think [legal recog-
nition] would go a long way to legitimizing our relationships, in the eyes of other people‖ 
and another saying ―I want the government to do it, so all these people, they can just shut 
up!‖ SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE AND LAW 126–27 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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entitled to no public support, and perhaps not even to toleration.
36
 Religious 
exemptions could mitigate this tendency to statist domination of civil 
society,
37
 but non-religious persons and institutions responding only to their 
understanding of what is naturally good for men, women, and children, 
could still be pressed to violate their consciences. 
 The difficulty here lies in the very idea of validation. Legal ―recog-
nition‖ in the sense used in this article is not just the notice of a fact. It is a 
communal imprimatur. It may not go so far as to make the act in question 
mandatory, but it does aver that there is nothing significantly wrong with it.  
 True tolerance, by contrast, takes no position in favor or against the act 
or relationship in question. It leaves others with full behavioral liberty to 
engage in the conduct, without endorsing what they do in any way. 
Gamblers may be left at liberty without affirming that what they are doing is 
a good thing. But the legal validation of gambling debts affirms that public 
policy supports them. 
 It is of utmost importance for peace in a liberal polity that same-sex 
activity remain not prohibited but also not legally validated. Almost all 
citizens rejoice in the freedom and equality of a liberal political order. But 
many could not accept the establishment and enforcement of a contested 
moral order, even if it were a liberal one. 
 The great political problem is that toleration alone may no longer 
satisfy the gay rights movement. John Noonan has reflected upon how 
slavery and abortion became polity-shattering only when advocates for each 
cause escalated their demands from simple toleration to universal legal 
approval. Yet he also recognizes their difficulty in moderating those 
demands: ―[I]n a moral question of this kind, turning on basic concepts of 
humanity, … you cannot be content with the practical toleration of your 
[162]activities. You want, in a sense you need, actual acceptance, open 
approval, … the moral surrender of [your] critics.‖
38
  
 It behooves us all to find a way out of the impasse described by 
Noonan, a way generously to accommodate both sensibilities, in order to 
                                                 
36 See the important book by legal scholars both for and against same-sex marriage: 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock, 
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds. 2008) (arguing that legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage may lead to limits on speech at work and in school, to 
restrictions on licenses and conscience in the professions, and to a widespread intolerance 
for a different ethical vision).  
37 This is the tack taken by conservative David Blankenhorn and liberal Jonathan Rauch 
in A Reconciliation on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at WK11. 
38 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 82–
83 (The Free Press, 1979). 
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avoid yet another sort of civil war. Is there something more than ―practical 
toleration‖ that traditionalists can offer, something less than ―moral 
surrender‖ that can satisfy same-sex marriage advocates?  
A Proposal for the Non-Validation of New 
Marriages of Elderly Couples 
The disestablishmentarian position of this essay requires an obvious second 
step: The application of natural law morality to marriage, which now 
appears to many to be gratuitously endorsed by the state, must be excised in 
some dramatic way from our law. Even though, as I believe, current 
marriage law can in fact be justified on premises necessary for a liberal 
polity, those secular arguments are insufficiently convincing to many 
reasonable persons. Simple toleration of what gays and lesbians do privately 
with their liberty, even with the addition of public validation for same-sex 
unions that adopt, may not be adequate to avert ―civil war.‖ In order to 
persuade those who favor same-sex marriage that they are being treated 
fairly, contrary natural law marriage principles may need to be significantly 
removed from our law.  
More specifically: as long as every major sort of infertile heterosexual 
can get legally married, no matter how obvious and permanent that infertility 
may be, current law will seem arbitrarily to establish the moral or religious 
judgment that homosexual activity is bad. This sense of official unfairness 
among persons and among moralities may require that marriages of 
obviously infertile heterosexuals no longer be legally recognized. 
As previously discussed, the one sort of infertility which is already a 
matter of public record, and which therefore would require no great invasion 
of privacy to use as a legal criterion for infertility, is age. Past a certain age, 
women become overwhelmingly infertile. The proposal made here is for the 
law to choose some age (50?, 60?, 70?—let us decide) beyond which 
marriage would not be recognized for any couple, on grounds of infertility.
39
 
[163]In order not to discriminate against women in the course of 
undoing discrimination against homosexuals, the law should treat both sexes 
equally: Only when both the would-be husband and the would-be wife are 
                                                 
39 Conservative thinker Allan Carlson postulates that if people were given civil marriage 
benefits only during their ‗natural‘ time of procreative potential, there would be a 
possible reconnect of procreation with marriage. He proposes the age of forty-five or 
younger for women, as their ‗natural‘ age, while approximating an age in men, due to 
Viagra and the like, would be more difficult. See ALLAN C. CARLSON, CONJUGAL 
AMERICA: ON THE PUBLIC PURPOSES OF MARRIAGE 18–19 (Transaction Pub, 2006). 
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above the officially set age should their vows have no legal significance. 
(The other sort of equal treatment of sex would be a mistake: To say that if 
either the male or the female were above the set age they could not marry 
would leave those children engendered by an older man and a younger 
woman without the protection of a marriage bond between their parents.)  
It is true that a post-menopausal (and thus presumptively infertile) 
woman could still marry a younger man under this proposal, which would 
leave marriage law imperfectly mapped onto potential fertility, but there is 
no other acceptable solution that does not give older men more rights than 
older women.  
There is one other way in which marriage law should not be quite abso-
lute in its exclusion of legal matrimony for elderly women. Whatever age is 
chosen, it is possible in theory for some very unusual woman to remain 
fertile after that age. Therefore, the elimination of heterosexual marriage 
after some certain age should be subject to an exception. Where the female 
partner is already pregnant, marriage should be permitted, as in the shotgun 
marriages of old, so that the child will at least be born in wedlock.
40
 
Would this age-based proposal be politically sufficient (along with the 
proposal for civil unions joining any same-sex couples who adopt) to 
overcome the common sense of legal unfairness toward homosexuals? One 
cannot know, but its enactment would at least be a significant step on the 
part of the law to tailor marriage more closely to fertility. Same-sex people 
would no longer feel alone in not having their sexual relationships validated 
by the state.
                                                 
40 If IVF treatments continue to advance, it could even become common for post-
menopausal women to become pregnant. Once again, this paper takes no position on 
whether such impregnations should or should not be allowed by law or morality. But if 
they are ever permitted, the protection of children requires that marriage be made 
available once they successfully occur.  
  
 
